University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings

Faculty Publications

2004

Insurance Coverage for Damages for Emotional Distress in
Montana
Greg Munro
University of Montana School of Law, greg.munro@umontana.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/faculty_barjournals
Part of the Insurance Law Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Munro, Greg, "Insurance Coverage for Damages for Emotional Distress in Montana" (2004). Faculty
Journal Articles & Other Writings. 58.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/faculty_barjournals/58

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at ScholarWorks at University of
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Journal Articles & Other Writings by an authorized
administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

'

INSURANCB CoNsuMER

CouNsnt's ColuMN

INSun¡Ncn CoveRAcn FOn D¡l,r¡CBs Fon EuorroN¡r Drsrnnss IN MONr¡se
nv PxopnssoR Gn-ec Murvno

,Emotional

ander uarioas names such as mental sttfering,
mentøl angaish, neruutls shock, and includes ail highþ ønþleasant mental
reactions, such asfright, borror, gri$ shane, enþarrassment, anger,
distress passes

chagrin, disappoinìtrnent, and worry. Howeuer,

it is onþ

when ernotional

liabiliry ari:es'"
Robetts w Saylot, (I(ansas

distress is extreme thatþossible

Inttoduction
Society has become more aware
mind-body connection. \ù7e
the
of
have long recognized that severe
injury to a person's body may cause
measurable limits on strength, endurance, and tange of motion and Produce pain. Tort law has taken
cogrizance of these physical manifestations of injuries to the person because they are consideted observable,
verifìable, and therefore, teal. At the
least, the civil justice system has rec-

ognized that such physical manifestations cost money to remedY and
cause a person to lose work so theY
constitute measurable damages of
pecuniary import appropriate for jury
consideration.
The same system has been much
slower in recognizing damages to the
mind suffeted by victims of torts,
especially injury to the mind caused
by watching loved ones get maimed
or killed. Today, we know that not
only does severe injury to the body
cause injury to the mind, but that
witnessing catastrophic injury to a
loved one or the physical effects of
such injury to a loved one likely
causes the same mental damage.
Therapists who treat patients now
recognize the unique debilitating
effects of such resulting maladies as
post-traumatic Sttess disorder and
emotional distress. They understand
the import of symptoms such as

Prcp.26

investigation and proof of emotional
disttess damages must be left to other
sources. As in many other areas, the
law here is best undetstood by looking at the relevant line of cases and
statutes in their historical context.

1981)1

memory loss, anxiety, depression,
mental preoccupation, tearfulness,
personality change, and compulsivity,

History of the develoPment of
ttemotional distresst' in Montana
In England, in 1808, Lord
Ellenborough held that, at common
law, there could be no recoverY fot

and appreciate theit signifìcance in
diagnosing emotional distress and
other trauma-related disorders of the
mind. Modern medicine recognizes
the intricate interrelationship between
the health of the body and that of

the wrongful death

the mind.

determination

Hence, the standard of cate for
plaintiffs' counsel is to identify emotional distress not only in the physically injured plaintiff but in famllry
membets who may be suffering.

Family members must be carefully
assessed for psychological or emotional injury to develop effective

proof of the injury as a recovetable
damage for putposes of negotiation
and trìal. F{owever, recovering damages for emotional distresò requires
that the law recognize as compensable the particulat form of emotional
distress suffered by the client. In
many cases, recovery also requires
that the insurance policy providing
coverage for the claim involving
emotional distress recognizes emotional distress as a covered damage.
This article has the twin PurPoses
of exploring the citcumstances in
which Montana tort law recognizes
emotional distress as compensable
and examining the problem of securing insurance coverage of emotional
distress damages. Techniques for

of

a Person.2

Padiament eventually sought to address the harshness of the rule by
enacting Lord Campbell's Act v¡hich
provided an zctton for wrongful
death.3 The act provided

of

for iury

damages as follows:

...[A]"d in every such action
the jury may give such damages as they may think ProPortioned to the injuty resulting
from such death to the Patries
respectiveþ for whom and for
whose benefit such action shall
be brought.,.
However, Lord Campbell's Act
'was construed by the
Queen's Bench

in 1852 to refuse recovery for mental
anguish in a wrongful death action.a
The court said that the purPose of
the Act v/as compensating families of
those killed and not "solacing their
wounded feelings." Hence, the
Queen's Bench found it eror for the
trial court to have instructed that the
jury, in addition to compensation for
loss of support, could comPensate a
widow for her emotional pain. The
court reasoned that a jury could not
find some pecuniary measure for the
damage so as to make

it too difficult

to determine.
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The nrle that, in

a

wtongful

death action, one could not be compensated for emotional pain became
known as the "English tule" and was

followed by most American iurisdictions.s In Montana, the rule was relegated to history by the SuPreme
Cout in 1983 in Dawson w llill &

IIì11 Truck Lines at the urging of
the late John Hoyt. Hoyt represented
a couple whose l7-year-old son was a
high school supersta{ slated to be
valedictorian of his class in May of
1982. He was killed when a ddver for
Hill & Hill Truck Lines attempted to
pass two cars during a snowstorm
near Belt, Montana. The truck collided head-on with another oncoming
semi, and the careening trucks struck
the car in which Dawson's son rode,
killing him.
'
At that time, Montana permitted
recovery for loss of society and companionship but imposed apecutiary
loss rule allowing those losses only to
the extent that they had a pecuniary
value.6 The question Hoyt posed was:
"Ate damages for the sorrow, mental
distress or gdef of the parents of a
deceased minor recoverable in a

wrongful death action brought pursuant to section2T-1-512, MCA,
1.979?" (À4ontana's wrongful death
statute.) The court, in holding that

highway near Big Timber, Montana,
when a semi-ttuck dtiver neqligently
collided with Versland causing his
death. Versland's wife, Sharon, witnessed part of the collision and then
saw her husband's body at the collision scene. She sought to recover for
negligent infliction of emotional
travma caused by witnessing the collision that caused her husband's death.
Eillon represented the latest
advance in recovery for bystanders.
Prior decisions had required first that
the bystander herself suffer some
physical impact, andlatei, that the
bystander atleast be in the "zone of
danger" before she could recover foÍ

emotional distress. The Montana

in Versland followed
Dillon in rejecting both limitations
Supreme Court

and allowing recovery if it was reasonably foreseeable that defendant's
conduct which causes injury or death

to a farrtsly member would cause
mental distress to another farnjly
member who witnessed the accident.
The court considered the Dillon
factors to determine whether emotional distress would be considered
foreseeable so as to invoke a duty of
care to the bystander and ultimately
adopted its own three factors:

1) The shock must result

"damages for the sorrow, mental
disüess or grief of the parents of a

from adirect emotional impact
upon plaintiff from the sen-

deceased minor are recoverable,"

sory and contemporaneous
perception of the accident, as
contrasted with learning of the
accident from others after its

tetired the English de and overruled
"[a]ny previous Montana decisions, to
the extent they conflict with this
holding."

occufrence.

2) The plaintiff

Emotional distress of the
'(bystandert'
The same day that Dawson u
Ilìllwas decided, the Montana coutt
followed the landmark Caltfornta
case of Dillon u Legg,7 in recognizing for the first time a cause of action for negligent infliction of mental
and emotional distress. In Vercland
v Caton Ttanspott,s Bert Versland
was ddving ahay batler wagon on a

Tnrer TnpNos - Sunrupn 2004

and victjm
must be closely related, as corluasted with an absence of any
relationship or the presence of

only a distant relationship.

3) Eithet

death or serious

physical injury to the victim
must have occutted as a result
of defendant's negligence.

Importantly, Vercland held that
physical manifestations

of

emotional

trauma would not be required to

support aþrimafacia case for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

The problem with Vetsland
Unfortunately, the corollaty to
Vetslandwas that the family member
who was not present at the scene
could not recover. "Íhe 1992 case of
Maquirc u State of Montanae'iJustrated that category of cases in which
the Dillon/Vetsland tests would
deny recovery to one who clearþ
suffered emotional distress. Mrs.
Maguire had an autistic and severely
retarded daughter ryho could not
communicate. At age four, she placed
her in the Montana Development
Center, an institution run by the State
of Montana. \)Øhen the daughter was
an adult, her caregiver at the MDC
raped and impregnated her. The elder
Mts. Maguire had to deal with a number of difficult issues of the pregr7aîcy,including: 1) whether the baby
would suffer the same diseases as its
mother;2) whether to have the baby
aborted in spite of her Catholic religion; 3) whethet to raise the baby or
place it for adoption; and 4) whether
her daughter was safe. Undoubtedly,
Mrs. Maguire suffered greatly from
stress and depression and the resulting symptoms of which she complained like trouble sleeping,
nightmares, contemplation of suicide,
and generally feeLing run down. She
required multiple visits to her doctor
and a psychologist.
The question facing the court in
Maguirc was whether Mts. Maguire
could maintasn an action in court for
her emotional disttess. Though she
manifested very substantial mental
and perhaps even physical

injur¡

the

court found she could not meet
Vercland's "presence requirement"
that "the shock must result from a
direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous perception of the accident as
contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occur-
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rence." Not could she meet the presence tequirement of Restatement of
Torts $ 46 (2) which provides for
recovery for injury to a claimant for
extfeme and outrageous conduct
directed at a third person:

The jury found Supersave negli-

about damages for emotional distress

intro-

recklessly causes severe emotional

gent and awarded $17,000 in damages for emotional distress. At trial,
Johnson proved no physical injury or
mental injury, so that the question
was "Whether emotional disüess
damages are proper in a negligence
action absent finding of injury." The
Johnson court noted that in Versland
they rejected any requirement that
some physical manifestation must be

distress:

present to support a "prinafaria case

factthatthe coutt found the neces-

to a member of such petson's
immediate farnity who is present
at the time, whether or not such
distress results in bodily harm,

for negligent infliction of emotional
distress." They further noted that

sary legally protected interest to be

(2) Where such conduct is directed at

third person, the actor is subject
to liability if he intentionally ot
a

(a)

of
þ) to any

other percon

who is

þresent at the tine, if such distress
results in bodily hatm.

there is a diffetence between injury
and distress, confrming that whete
there is "either a psychic or physical
injury causally related to the incident
in question there is compensabiliry."
The court said, "Llere we hav€ no

testimony supporting injury. $7e must

The court noted that it had allowed recovery of emorional distress

without physical injury in
tohnson w Supersave and -IVrIes r¿
Big Sky Eyeweaqto but pointed out
that, in both cases, the victim was not
a third party. Either the conduct had
to be rìirected at Maguire or Maguire
had to be present regardless of the
damages

causal connection between the

defendant's conduct and Mrs.
Maguire's resulting injury. Recovery
was denied.

Emotional disttess of the claimant absent a showing of physical
or mental iniuty
lohnson w Supetsaverll was
decided shortly after Vercland and
represented another category of
emotional distress claims - those
involving no physical or mental injuty. Johnson was arrested and jailed
on a bad-check warrant alur-ough he
had made complete restitution on the
check six months before his arrest.
Supersave had failed to tell its collection agency, which filed the bad
check complaint with the county
attorney's office, that the check had
been made good.
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decide whether to allow cornpensation for mental distress absent injury
and,

if

so, under what circum-

stances." The decision states:

This coutt adopts the species
of case approach which requires a factual analysis of
each case to detetmine
whether the alleged "emotional distress" merits compensation. In determining
whether the distress is compensable absent a showing of
physical or mental injuty, we

will look to whether tortious
conduct results in a sabstantial
invasion of a legaþ protected
interest and causes a signfrcant
impact upon the person of

plaintiff.
In Johnson, the court found
Jiberty to be the right substantially
invaded and held it proper for the
juty to award Johnson damages for

emotional distress.

tohnson was followed in 1989
First
Bank (N.A.)-Billings u
by
Clatk,12 abank bad faith case in
which the court held that the trial
coutt erred in instructing the jury

because the claimant failed to

duce any evidence of damage from
the emotional distress. Quoting

tohnson, the court required "some
proof that plaintiff's tortious conduct
resulted in 'a substantial invasion of a
legally protected interest and . .

.

fcaused] a significant impact on the

person."'
Of particular importance is the

"the interest in freedom from emoäonal distress." However, the court
noted that "the cause of action arises
only if the invasion of this interest is
substantial and the impact sþificant," adopting comment þ) of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts $ 46
(1965) which is quoted in the opinion:

Emotional distress passes
under vafious flames such as
mental suffering, mental anguish, mental or nervous
shock, or the like. It includes
all highly unpleasant mental
teactions such as fright, horror, gitef, shame, humiliation,
embarrassment, anger, cha-

grin, disappointment, worry,
and nausea. It is only v¡here it
is extreme that the liabiJity
arises. Complete emotional
uanquility is seldom attainable in this wodd, and some
degree of transient and trivial

emotional distress is a part
the pdce of living among
people. The law intervenes
only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no

of

reasonable person could be
expected to endure it. The

intensity and the duration of
the distress ate factors to be
considered in determining its
severity. . . The distress must
be reasonable and justifìed
under the citcumstances, and
there is no liability where the
plaintiff has suffered exagger-
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ated and unreasonable emotional distress, unless it results

from

www;atla.or o

susceptibilty
to such disttess of which the
a peculiar

ATLA's Uttimote Weþ Resource

actor has knowledge . . . It is
for the court to determine
whether on the evidence severe emotional distress can be
found; it is fot the jury to detetmine whether, on the evidence, it has in fact existed.

õ

\

qmflæ

shæræ

At trial, Clark alleged only that
he "felt bad, lost sleep, and became
withdrawn" as a result of the Bank's
conduct; The court said its adoption
of the Restatement comment was
'ionly a new interpretation of the
existing'significant impact' requirement" in refusing to remand for a
nev¡ trial on emotional distress.

ffi

Recognition of the tort of
emotional distress

In

WrerereEE

1995, recognizing that the law
of emotional distress had become a
complex patchwork in which the
exceptions had eaten the rules, the
court set out to simplify the area by

4 Keep abreast of changing

of negligent and
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Independenf Press, Inc.13 When

infliction of emotional distress, negli.
gent infliction of emotional distress,
and civil rights violations. All five
counts were dismissed on motions
for summary judgment, resulting in
an appeal to thdMontana Supreme
Court. Hence, the court was pre-

4

newsletter-ATL[ I@w News Digest

recognizing the torts

photographic negatives and proof
sheets and filed criminal charges
against her. When the criminal proceedings were ultimately dismissed,
Sacco brought a civil action against
the ptincipals of HCIP and the police
offìcer involved alleging malicious
prosecution, defamation, intentional

legislative and congressional news

sented with the issue of whether
Montana would recognize causes of
action for intentional and negligent
infLiction of emotional distress. Until
that time, emotional distress was
recognized primariþ as a " parasittc"
damage to a host cause of action, the
taditional rule having been that there
could be no recovery for the negligent infliction of mental distress
alone,la

However, the court took the

BÆNcNcru
oF

SCAL6

JUffiG

occasion to recognize the tort

of

negligent infliction of emotional
distress in Montana:
Therefore, we adopt the following standard for determin-

ing whether a plaintiff has
demonstrated a cause of action for the negligent infliction
of emotional distress. A cause
of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress will

Pece 31

r
ì

atise under circumstances
where serious of sevefe emotional distress to the plaintiff
was the reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the defendant's
negligent act or omission.

The court emphasized tepeatedly
that the standard required 1) ptoving
that the emotional distress suffered
was severe or serious, and 2) that the
emotional distress was the reasonably
foreseeable consequence of the
defendant's negligent act or omission.
The court cited Restatement (Second)
of Tortsls for the role of judge and

jury in determining emotional distress:

It is for the court to detetmine
v¡hether on the evidence severe
[serious] emotional disttess can

be found; it is for the jury to
detetmine whethet, on the evidence, it

has

in fact existed.

Again; the court defined "serious" of "sevefe" emotional distress
by quoting Restatement (Second) of
Torts, $ 46, comment Q) at77-78
(quoted above).

The court then conceded on
review thatit had tacidy approved

of emotional
as a separate cause of action

intentional infliction
distress

in three casesl6 and therefore proceeded to state a new cause ofaction for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. In so doing, it
abandoned the former requitement
that the damage of emotional distress be appendant to "outrageous"
conduct.
. . . aî independent cause of
action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress will arise
under circumstances where
serious of sevefe emotional
distress to the plaintiff was the
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's intenlional act or omission.

The court reiterated that dar¡,-

for emotional distress are
compeflsatory and not punitive but
ages

concluded:
NØe

concludethatan award of

punitive damages is the proper
method of addtessing the culpability and intentional nature

of the defendant's conduct in
an intentional infliction of
emotional distress case.

Tesffimony
rtilied experts in
all health-care disciplines.
Available to review and test¡fy
in medical negligence cases.
30 years, 6,000 cases
Member, American Gollege
of Legal Medicine

ey references statewide

In

essence, the elements

of

the

two torts are the same, the only difference being in the culpability of
defendantb conduct which may result
in punitive damages being awarded
under MCA S 27 -1,-220 in addition to
the damage for emotional distress.
Sacco was intended to simplify and
modernize the rules with regard to
recovery of damages fot emotional
disüess. Hurdles such as the bystander requirements of Vetsland,
the "substantial invasion of a legalJy
protected intetest" of tohnson, and
the "outrageous" conduct requifement of Maguite all were relegated
to the museum of past doctrines by
the court in Sacco.

Triggering the (rpet accident"
limits of insurance coverage with
emotional distress
Tacttcally, the effort to obtain an
adequate recovery for the injuted
party often involves an attempt to
recover an additional limit of insurance essentially doubling the potential recovery of the clients in serious
cases. The only way to obtain the
"per accident" limit as opposed to
the "per person" limit of auto insutance is to establish that another
person has suffered an injuty cognizal:/reby the coutt as an independent
cause of action. Otherwise, a parasitic damage suffered by a family
membet and appendant to the claim
of the person who suffered bodily

injury will not trigger a separate limit
of insurance. For example,in Bain
u. GleasonrlT the court established

that a spouse's loss of consorlium
claim is indeed a distinct and independent cause of action under tort
law However, the court held that the
spouse's consortium claim is detivative of the bodily injury claim of the
person suffering the direct physical
injury.

The standard ISO language

of

ìnsurance poLicies tends to defìne

"Bodily lnjuty" as follows:

Pncp,32
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'ßodiþ Injary means bodily

injur¡

sickness, or disèase,

including death at any time
resulting therefrom, sustained
by a person."

The same forms define the injured person's "damages" to include
the services of that pefson:
'Damagaswith respect to Cov-

A Þodily injuty Coverage] includes damages for care
and loss of services."
erage

Therefore, the court in Bain
concluded that the spouse's consortium claim is included within the
"each pefson" limitation on auto
insurance coverage and does not
tdgger the additional or "per acci-

dent" limit:
"!üe therefore interpret the
mandatory motor vehicle insufance statutes now in effect
to mean that the cause of action for loss of consortium by

the deprived spouse and the
cause of action for bodily injuries by the injured spouse are
subject together to the 'one
person limitation' found in
S 61-6-103, MCA, as referred

to in $ 61,-6-301, MCA."
We should note, however,th^t
whether consortium trþgers an additional limit depends on the insurer's
definition in the particular policy. For
example, the coutt in Bain noted that
an Allstate policy that defined bodily

injury as "bodily injury, sickness,
disease or death to a person, including loss of seruices" resulted in triggering additional covetage. Under that
defirrition, the spouse suffedng loss
of consortium has suffered "bodily
injury" so as to trþger the "per accident" limit of coverage.
Emotional distress of a famtly
member of the physically injured
victim is so important because it

Tru¡r. TnpNos -

Suivrrvren 2004

presents the potential for recovering
the additional limit of coverage. In

ous impact requitement from

TteÌchel w State Fatm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co.r18 the Montana Supreme
Coutt held that negligent infliction of
emotional distress to a family member riggers the second or "per accident" limit of insurance.

was again injected

In'Íteichel, the petitioner,
Catoþ Treichel, had been riding
bicycles with her husband on Old
Montana Highway 200 near East

Vetsland. Consequentl¡ the issue

in Wages w Fitst
National Ins., Co. of Amedca.le

There, a child, Skylar \Øages, was run
over by a truck whjle roller-blading in
front of his home. The father, Gerald
'Wages,

was notified at work and went
to the hospital. Skylar's serious inju-

ries included pelvic fracture and com-

plete urethral disruption which
required four major invasive surgeries, physical therapy, and catheteitzation performed by his father three or
four times each day. Ultimately,
Gerald suffered extensive work loss,
medical expense, and other ltnancial
obligations by reason of his care for
Skylar. He fìled his own claim for
Àegligent infliction of emotional

Missoula, Montana, v¡hen she witnessed a car collide with her husband,
inflicting a grievous head injury and
causing his death. The paties agreed
that she met all necessary elements of
â cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court
refused State Farm's argument that
her claim should be treated the same
as Bain's claim for loss of consortium and considered derivative. Instead, the court held that Caroþ
Treichel "w^s a second injured person in the accident" so that the
"Each r{.ccident" limits in the policy

independent non-derivative claim for
negligent infliction of emotional
distress without having witnessed the
accident so as to suffer some contemporaneous impact. However, the

applied.

court reiected the position quoting

disüess ro which the defense took the
position that he could not sustain an

Treichelin holding:

Kílling the risen specter of
bystander requirements

In Treichel, in the process of
distinguishing the emotional distress
claim in that case from the Bain loss
of consortium claim, the court stated:

Unlike Caroþ, the plaintiff in

Bainwas not at the scene:of
the accident and did not witness the injuries to his spouse.

*x*Caroþwasaseparate

person who received an independent and direct injury at
the accident scene. Her serious
and sevete emotional distress
was the reasonably foreseeable
consequence of Hintz's negligence.

On reading this language, defense counsel could not resist the
position that the court, in 'Íreichel,
had reintroduced the contemporane-

"[]n clarifying the elements of
a clakn for negligent infliction
of emotional distress in
Sacco,we eliminated the other
various sorts of theories by
which independent torts of
negligent infliction of emo-

tional distess came into Montanalaw such as the Vetsland
bystander analysis."

The court said that its language

in Trcichelwas intended to support
the distinction between NEID claims
and loss of consortium claims. Nor
did the court accept the position that
one must be at the scene of the accident to be a foreseeable plaintiff
saying, "In Sacco we severed the
previously mandatory nexus between
witnessing the accident and foreseeabiliry and established that a defendant can owe a duty to a NIED
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claimant even in circumstances where
the claimant was not at the scene of
the accident." The court then set out
guidelines for determining foreseeability in NEID cases:

For such a determination, the
court may consider such factors as the closeness of the
relationship between the plaintiff and victim, the age of the
victim, and the severity of the
injury of the victim, and any
other factors bearing on the
question. Moreovef, the court
may consider whether the

plaintiff was a bystander to
the accident. It may not, however, rely exclusively on the
fact that a plarnttff was flot a

bystander to conclude that
such a plaintiff is an unforeseeable plaintiff.

Vages appeared to establish that
the law

of

emotional distress is that

which is set out in Sacco, unencumbered by the theories and requiremerìts thathadvexed those representing injured persons during the
development of emotional distress
law.

,\gain,

in llendcksen

the proposition that one need not be
a bystander to claim emotional disuess damages. Being a bystander is a
factor to be considered, but is not, by

itself, determinative.
The court also found the trial
court erred in concluding that the
heightened standard of severe or

by Sacco
only applied in cases where there is
no physical or mental injury. The
court clarified that emotional distress
must always be severe or serious
regardless of physical or mental
manifestation. The court cited Restatement (Second) of Torts, $ 46,
commerit k for the proposition that
" [n]ormally, severe emotional distress
is accompanied or followed by shock,
illness, or other bodily harm,which in
itself affords evidence that the distress
is genuine and severe." The court
said, "A jury instruction on emotional
distress should state that the sevete
and serious standard applies and that
this standard can be met by proof
that emotional distress resulted in
shock, illness, or other bodily haÍm."
serious distress required

w State,2o

the court conlrmed that one is not
required to be a bystander to recover
damages for emotional distress suffered as a result of serious injury to a
family membet. There, a mothet

watched asher 3-year-old slipped
through a stakway balustrade at the
Monrana State University library and
fell head first 20 feet to the concrete
floor belov¡. Immediately after the
accident, she leatned that another
child had fallen through the same
staitway weeks eadler. Her position
was that the knowledge of the eadier
fall was a factor in causing her emotional distress þost-traumalic stress
syndrome). The State's position was
that she could not claim emotional
distress damages caused by the earlier
fall because there was no ditect emo-
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tional impact upon the plaintiff from
the sensory and contemporaneous
perception of the accident. Howevet,
the court cited Sacco and Vages for

Getting insurance to cover the tort
Exuberance over the develop-

ment and clarifrcald'on of emotional
distress law has been dampened
somewhat by the recent reminder
that, for plaintiffs, all is lost if insurance

temoved I(eyser from the vehicle. At
that point, Jacobsen sav/ a gun underneath the body. I(eyser died later
from what was determined to be
suicide by gunshot.
Jacobsen sought counseling for
emotional distress from the events
and ultimately made claim against his
own insurer, Farmers Union Mutual,
for benefìts under the uninsured and
medical pay coverages, (I(eyser was
uninsured.) The district court granted
the insurer summary judgment on the
twin grounds that 1) Jacobsen's emotional injuries did not constitute
"bodily injury''within the meaning
of the UM statute S 33-23-201ot the
UM policy agreement, and2) the
emotional disttess did not arise from
use of an uninsuted motor vehicle

but from

a handgun.

The UM basic insuring agreement corìtained standard language:
l7e will pay a\1. sums the "insured" is legally entitled to
fecovef as compensatory
damages from the owner or
driver of an 'Íuninsured motot
vehicle." The darnages must
result from "bodily injury"
sustained by the "insured"
caused by an "accident.2'The
owner's or dtiver's liabiJity for
these damages must result
from the ownership, maintenânce or use of the "uninsured motot vehicle."

will not cover the conduct of

the tortfeasor or the resulting dam-

of tacobsen u.
Fatmerc Union MutuaL Insutance
Companfl reflects that ugly fact of
ìife. Jacobsen was driving his vehicle
age. The recent case

on the four-lane highway near
Vaughn, Montana, when he saw a
vehicle veer across the center median,
cross the highway, and crash in a
wheat field. Jacobsen found l(eyser in
the vehicle bleeding profusely from
the head. He tried to control the
bleeding until patamedics arrived and

The policy's definition of "bodily
injaryi'which is consistent with the
statute's, was as follows:

"Bodily injury" means bodily
injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person including
death resulting

ftom

any

of

these.

Jacobsen atgued that the courtb

holding in Treìchel, that

Caroþ

Treichel's emotional disttess zt watch-
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intentional tort and its punitive damIn this case, expert medical
ing her husband get killed in a bike/
age claim.
inttodu-ced
at
testimony
was
injury"
car collision was "bodily
If the emotional distress arises
trial which described lGistin's
under the provisions of the State
from an auto accident and the
PTSD symptoms. The expert
Farm policy, apptied in his case.
is uninsured, one can still
tortfeasor
this
stated
well-tecognized
pointed
out
that
However, the court
allege intentional infliction of emomental injury has physical
State Farm's policy in Treicåel did
tional distress and recover under
components, including brain
not defìne bodily injuty and that the
uninsured motorist coverage. The
chemistry and hotmone le-vel
policy cleady covered such claims as
Montana Supreme Court has held
alterations. PTSD symptoms
loss of consortium. Further, State
that conduct can be intenFarm was willing to cover
tional so as to fall outside
emotional injuries but only
the tortfeasor's liabiJity
up to the "one pefson"
coverage and stjll be l'accilimitation in the policy. The
Sacco provides plaintiffs'counsel with a
dental" from' the victim's
Tteichel court had held
simple and clear remedy for any person
perspective
so as to fall
simply
that State Farm was
estopped to deny covefage
and found that Caroþ

Treichel had suffered an
"independent and direct"
injury as was deemed com-

who has foreseeably suffered severe or
ser¡ous emot¡onal distress at the hands of
one act¡n g negligently or intentionally.

il

pensable in Sacco.

1l

In essence, what the court said in
tacobsen is that finding a person has
suffered an emotional "injury" for
purposes of tort law does not mean

to an emotional
travma that leads to a physical
impact upon the brain.

the emotional injury is "bodily injury" undet insurance contract law.
The court quoted with approval
Farmers Union's assertion that
"ft]here is no dispute that Montana
tort law allows for tecovery of purely
emotional damages. However, this
case involves the interpretation of
contract, and tort law is wholly irrelevant to that interpretation." The

Counsel needs to develop the
theory with experts that a manifest
mental injury is nothing but a reflecúon of physical impacts in brain
chemistry, hormone levels, and
other components of the body's
physiology.
Suffìce it to say that counsel
should always consider the potential
unintended (and undesirable) consequences of pleading interutiorual inflic-

1i

]ii

i'
,ll

,i)
,ì

I

lll
t¡l
i

Ìl

i'
l

I

I

ll

court held that"the term 'bodily
injury,' as defined in Farmers Union
UM policy, is limited to physical
injury to a person caused l>y an acitdent and does not include emotional
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and psychological injuries stemming
therefrom. Consequently, the coutt
declined to answer whethet l(eyser's
infliction of emotional distress on
Jacobsen atose from the use of the
auto as opposed to the handgun.
SØhere the applicable insutance
coverage is for "bodily injury,"
tacobsen makes it imperarive that
counsel approach development of the
claim the way Monte Beck apparently

are a response

tion of emotional distress as an
intentional tort. ìØhile it presents the
defendant with a risk of punitive
damages, it may allow the tortfeasots'
liability insurers off the hook under
an intentional acts exclusion ot on
the ground that the basic cor.erage
agreement only covers "accidents." If
feasible and not in violation of Rule
1.1, counsel may be wise to accompàny à count for intentional infliction of emotional distress with one

within the victim's UM
coverage,'2

Conclusion
The tort law of em<¡tional distress that developed in Montana came al>out as a
tortured system fot getting around

hatsh common law rules that disallowed emotional distress recovery
entìrely. Sacco provides plaintiffs'
counsel with a simple and clear remedy for any person who has
foreseeably suffered severe or serious
emotional distress at the hands of
one acting negligendy or intentionally.
Bystander's restrictions, requirements
for proof of invasion of substantial
personal interests, and other require-

ments of the pre-Sacco cases should
not hinder counsel anymore. However, if the emotional distress claim
cannot be supported by evidence that
it is severe or serious, it will lack
credibility and may not merit prosecution,

with all claims, counsel pleading and proving the emotional dis,{.s

did in .Flenricksen.In reviewing

for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. Then, under the "four corners" rule, the catrier will likely have
to defend and still cope with the

tress claim must keep one eye on
potential insutance coverage. Insurance benefits depend on the language
of the insurance coverage, and ultimately recovery may hinge entirely
on whether, under the facts of the
particular case and the language of
the applicable polic¡ the claimant's
emotional distress is a "bodily

Henticksen, the court noted:

potential conflicts injected by the

injury."
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Business cases accountfor 47o/o
of all punitive damage awards.
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of punitive damage awards are
due to product liability and
medical malpractice cases
respect¡vely.
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Myth #4: "Civil jury trials are clogging the courts."
Fact: The vast majority of tort .ulJr u* resolved by neither juries nor judges. In
stâte courts, only five percent of tort cases were disposed of by trial in 2001,.
Examining tlte lWork of Søø Couús, 2002 Q003).
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Myth #5: "The legal sysrem's 'cosr to society' is an esrimated $200 billion a yeat"
Fact: This widely-discredited 9200 billion figure is a calculation based on all
insurance premiums - even auto insurance for minor fender benders that never
come close to a couftfoom,
In other wotds, the fìgure has nothing to do v¡ith lawsuits or the legal system.
It also includes the immense costs of operating the incredibly wastefulãnd ineffìcient insurance industry. Moreover, most of the costs of the system are the result
of corporate wrongdoing causing injury.
importa_ntly, such numbers fail to factor in the cost savings, particularþ
-More
to the taxpayer, of compensation and product safety. see Americani fór Insurance Reform, "Tillinghast's 'Tort cost' Figures vastly overstate the cost of the
American Legal System [anuary 2004).

Myth #6: "Huge, multi-million-dollar punirive damages awards are rourine."
Fact: Awards of punitive damages in tort cases are both infrequent and modest
in size. According to the most recerit data from the Bureau of justice Statistics of
the u.S. Justice Department, punitive damages are imposed in only 3.3 percent of
cases, and the median (typical) punitive damages award is $38,000. "Toit Trials
and Verrlicts in Large Counties, 1.996," U.S. Department of
Justice, Bureau of

Justice Statistics, NCJ 179769 (August 2000).
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